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The Functional Prerequisites of
Intentional Communicative Systems

Joseph N. Cappella
I. Reason and Law-Like Explanation
Speculative and behavioral students of communication hâve
viewed each other with a certain intellectual suspicion from
the safety of their "humanistic" or "scientific" frames of référ-

ence. Furthermore, neither group appears to hâve capitalized
significantly from the insights of the other. This paper proposes

(a) to examine the assumptions underlying the position characteristic of each f rame of référence, ( b ) to explore the strengths

and weaknesses of each position, and (c) to attempt a synthesis
which will forge a new position for improving the prescriptive,
evaluative, prédictive, and explanatory power of speculative and
behavioral inquiry.

Speculative and behavioral investigations of communication
focus on a broad category of events involving thè transfer of
symbolic information, or the justification of choice regarding
information transfer, or the symbolic transfer of meaning, as
you will. Goals, too, are roughly équivalent in that both kinds of

inquiry seek to prescribe, evaluate, predict, and explain the
effects of various communicative acts. However, the kinds of

explanations generated by each method differ markedly. In
behavioral inquiry law-like explanations dominate, whereas in
speculative rhetorical theory or criticism, justifications or reason-explanations dominate.
In generai, any explanation seeks to subsume a given relationship, assertion, or phenomenon under a more generai relationship, assertion, or phenomenon which itself needs no further
explanation or, as Toulmin suggests, which "goes without say-

ing."1 In law-like explanations not only is the conclusion a
special case of the major premise, but the major and minor

premises together entail the conclusion in that the conclusion
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must follow once given the major and minor premises. Th

is not the case with reason-explanations since the conclusion
only made plausible by the major premise and need not follow
from it. For example, one might explain the prédominance of
emotional terms in a politicai speech by citing the speaker's i

tent to arouse his audience to action. Although the speake

intent makes the nature of the message plausible, in no way ca
we assume that his intent will necessarily lead to an emotion
message.

The différences just noted hâve implications, among them
the fact that the type of explanaüon one sees as appropriate to

a given System is usually predicated on and derivable from a
set of assumptions about the implicit nature of the System being

analyzed. Law-like explanations of communicative behavior,

for example, treat man as a stimulus-response System; given the

stimulus-response law and thè appropriate conditions, the response must follow. Now, while a large segment of behavior
is habituai, unconscious, and unintentional and, therefore, well
suited to law-like explanations, there exists a second segment
which is purposive and choice-oriented and, therefore, poorly
suited to law-like explanation. The first kind of behaviors, char-

acterized by thè mere passage of the subject from one spacetime point to another, I shall term "movements," and the second, characterized by conscious and willed choice among alter-

natives given a goal, I shall term "actions."2 As Toulmin3 has
argued, the attempt to characterize man's language behavior

as movement, while useful for scientific reasons, must inevitably be doomed to such a narrow and restricted conception that

only relatively insignificant questions can be posed and an-

swered. On the other hand, the characterization of man's lan-

guage behavior preeminently as action and only peripherally
as movement, while increasing the complexity and difficulty of
investigation, simultaneously broadens the range of posable questions.

The characterization of language behavior as action, that is,
the conscious and willed choice among alternatives given a goal,

suggests that understanding the reasons for choices will increase understanding of language behavior itself. Hence, the
explanation of significant aspects of language behavior must be
of the reason variety. Further, understanding the reasons for
choices is dépendent upon ascertaining the speaker's intent. However, there exist some serious drawbacks inhérent in thè tradì-
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tional method for thè characterizatian of intent. In seek
explain, evaluate, and prescribe spécifie communicative e
and to predict the effects of those events, rhetorical th
and critics have often sought to ascertain the (non-obser
intent of the speaker through évidence derived from his

servable) message. But in imputing communicative in
some internai state of the speaker, a state accessible o

an inference from the observable message, problems aris

to (a) the variability of subjective imputation of inte
invalid inferences, and (e) the "true" or "real" intent
speaker. Thus, given the goals of accurate explanation,
prédiction (that is, prédiction which is not posi hoc),

fective prescription, the speculative rhetorician finds hi

committed to either (a) fréquent errors in prédiction

académie excursions into post hoc analysis. On the other
the extreme S-R theorist, in focusing solely on the obser

(as befits the paradigm of the naturai sciences), shun

thing so non-observable and non-deterministic as intenti
thus finds himself in the equally untenable position of m
"valid" explanations and accurate prédictions on the least
ficant aspects of language behavior - the stimulus-respon
riety. I have, of course, simplified the characterizations
speculative and behavioral inquiry in order to highlight t

aspects of each method on which I propose to focus

remainder of this essay.

II. Predicting the Output of Intentional Systems

Since the problems of determining intentionality in la
behavior are of inévitable concern in studying langua
havior, I will propose a conceptualization of intent w

find useful, powerful, and intuitively appealing. D. C. Be
argues4 that predicting or explaining the output of a Syst

proceed at any of three levels: (a) the physical level, (
design level, or (e) the intentional level. Consider the e
of playing chess against a chess-programmed compute
trying to predict its moves (thè output). At a physical
knowledge of the circuit diagrams and the laws of a
physics would in principle permit accurate prédictions

ever, given the enormous complexity of chess playing com

and the rather limited intelligence of normal humans

prédiction is out of the question. At a design level, know
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of thè program instructions governing thè computerà ga
playing would permit accurate prédictions in principle. H

ever, with the increased sophistication of programming tech
niques and options that prospect would be useful to only a fe
individuals in the world! However, if one assumes that (a)
system "possesses" a goal or set of goals (checkmating, protec

ing the Queen, etc.), (b) the system "possesses" informati

and a set of constraints on that information defining altern
means to the goal (methods of attack and défense, castling fo

protection, etc.), and (c) the criteria for choice among alt
natives are in some sensé rational (the alternatives can b

rank-ordered on a "rational" basis given a goal), then thè out

put of the system can be predicted at an intentional lev
Chess Masters are capable of playing well against comput

not because they understand atomic physics, nor because the
hâve studied computer programming. Rather, they treat the
computer opponents like their human ones, as having goals a
alternatives to those goals very much like their own and, mo
importantly, with criteria for choice among alternatives wh
are either similar to their own or rational in the sensé of be
understandable given the goals of chess.
Bennett's model gives us a set of criteria for predicting an

explaining thè output of the communicative as well as ot
Systems. The problem facing thè listener in a communicat
situation is analogous to the problem facing the Chess Mas
in the above example. Since the listener does not have ac
cess to thè cognitive space of the speaker but only to hi
message, then understanding and responding to the intent
the speaker can only mean understanding and responding to
encoded message; which, in turn, implies that the speaker ha
an intent and the message has an intent, and that those i
tents need not be identical or even similar. Julius Stone,
Legal Systems and Lawyers Reasoning, underlines this pr

lem and intimâtes a solution in line with Bennett's while focus-

ing on the interprétation of judioial précédents:

The error of substituting author's intention for meaning
of language is that it ignores thè fact that a written work
once created acquires a meaning which, though still dépendent on men's usage, is still independent of its creator's
motives; and interprétation is precisely a search for this
meaning. 5
and
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. . . even if it were correct here to search for thè author's

intention, this author - the author legislator - must reason-

ably have intended that his language should bind ac-

cording to the community's understanding of it for thè
time being, rather than some original understanding of

his own.6

Thus, judicial Interpreters recognize (a) that a multiplicity of
meanings can be imputed to a message, and (b) that if there is
to be any agreement on the author's meaning or intent, some
norm for interprétation (for example, the community's understanding) of the message must be shared by the Interpreters.
Stone's community norms for interprétation would become, in

Bennett's paradigm, the shared rational criteria for choice

among alternatives. In addition to the shared criteria for choice,

Bennett contends that "valid" explanation and "accurate" prédiction will resuit only if the goals and means to those goals are
known and shared by thè behavioral or speculative investigators

of communication.

Furthermore, if Bennett's stipulation of three levels of analysis
is valid for any System, then my initial position on the fittingness

of reason-explanation to language behavior, to the exclusion of

law-like explanation, needs to be modified. The basic issue is
not the logicai impossibility of law-like or stimulus-response
explanations of language behavior, but rather that the nature

of the phenomenon is so complex as to defy analysis at the
physical or design levels. Toulmin supports the point:

So it would be unreasonable to look for one single mode

of explanation applicable to all kinds of human action
and behavior. Rather, we should expect to find varied

modes of psychological explanation applicable on différ-

ent levels and in différent situations.7

The practical issue then becomes, What kinds of questions are
best suited to inquiry within the intentional framework? Although it may be possible in principle to présent physical-level
descriptions of language behavior, both the nature of the phenomenon and the questions central to understanding it make

the success of such an endeavor doubtful at this time.

In turning away from a stimulus-response approach to lan-

guage behavior and taking up reason-explanations, I have
sought to set down through Bennett's paradigm a set of conditions in which explanation and prédiction via reasons will be the
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most powerful. However, it is necessary to transform the éléments and relations of Bennett's paradigm specifically to th

communication situation. The question to be faced next becomes
What conditions of meaning and its transfer will the Bennett
paradigm suggest which will ultimately lead to valid explan
tion and accurate prédiction of communicative events?

III. Meaning as Standardized Usage

Since any theory of communication or rhetoric must ultimately

explain the process of exchanging symbolic information, th

meaning, as well as the intent, of what I choose to convey mu
inevitably be explained either implicitly or explicitly. For this
purpose, it is possible to distinguish two levels of symbolic information: a personal or de facto level, and a social or de ju
level.8 That is, in categorizing those expériences with symbols

which are learned in the social arena of interaction, certain

idiosyncratic connotations and denotations become attached to
the symbol as part of its de facto meaning. (We will avoid the

issue of personal symbols for personal expériences.) Becaus

of the personalized and unique character of de facto meaning,
it cannot be accurately communicated to others unless (a) ther
has been a significant overlap of expériences to yield shared sig

nificance for thè communicating individuals, or (b) the ind

viduals actively attempt to build a shared significance through
a process of approximation with de jure meanings.

De jure meaning, one may argue, differs from de facto i

that two or more individuals hâve adopted a common valuing o
common understanding for a given symbol or set of symbols.
Thus, consensus on the naming, attributes, and/ or functions of
symbols marks de jure meaning. Clearly, de jure meanings are

readily communicable whereas de facto meanings are at bes

communicable through some process of approximation through
de jure meaning. Furthermore, thè transfer of symbolic inform
tion involves complex combinations of symbols which also hav
meaning différent from thè mere sum of the meanings of th

individuai symbols. While any one individuai may choose t
combine symbols according to his whim, he will not do so i

he wishes to transfer meaning accurately. That is, the combina
tions of symbols chosen will adhère to some norms to which th
individuals have agreed and these norms will indicate (a) which
combinations are allowed, and (b) what those combinations are
to count as or mean.
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Two apparently contradictory facts characteriz
symbolic activity: (a) symbols are social or sha
suggested above, and (b) symbols are flexible wit
of both de facto and, more importantly, de jure
other words, a given symbol (or combination of
sociated with a set of alternative de jure mean
and in the process of determining which alterna
range the other has intended, thè listener seldom
than a few of his "guesses" with thè speaker

faced with explaining how thè accurate transfer
occur with greater than random frequency if we
hérent flexibility of symbols. I propose that for

their combinations there exists a set of appro

tional, and normative symbol-referent associatio
combinations which are cued by the situation wit

munication takes place. I shall term thèse sets

choices among alternatives, standardized usages.
implicit or explicit situational eues reduce the ra
meanings, thereby increasing thè probability of

fer of meaning despite the inhérent flexibility of sy
At least two dimensions of the situation need to be cued

(either by the speaker or the physical environment itself) and

recognized (by the respondent) for standardized usages appropriate to the situation to be shared: (a) the System to which

the standardized usage is indigenous (ghetto dialect, congressional parlance, legal terminology, etc.), and (b) the function,
purpose, or goal of the interaction (persuasion, understanding,

uncertainty réduction, etc.). That is, to attain efficiency and
accuracy of communication within an interaction, standardized
usages must develop spontaneously or be developed intentionally.
However, that postulate présents certain problems. For example,

consider a conférence of behaviorists and speculative rhetoricians discussing the direction analysis of speech behavior should

take. If there is to be any degree of understanding, the two
groups must agrée to a set of standardized usages to govern
their meeting. They may (a) agrée to use standardized usages
familiär within the rhetoricians' System, (b) agrée to use stan-

dardized usages familiär within the behaviorists' System, (c)

agrée to a neutral System (say, of Cybernetics or General Sys-

tems' Theory), or (d) agrée to build a new set of standardized
usages by approximation from existing standardized usages.

Whatever their choice, there must exist consensus on a set of
standardized usages appropriate to this meeting.
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Second, each interaction situation can be viewed as a System
carrying out some function or set of functions at a given tim
Each of these functions is more or less necessary to thè main

tenance of thè System (thè interaction situation). If certa

functions fail, the System will disintegrate; if others fail, th

System may be altered only a little. For example, producti

functions - "getting the job done" - are often the most importa
functions of industriai Systems, complex organizations, busines
meetings, and the like; whereas, in family situations and even
in some forward-looking complex organizations, maintaining in

terpersonal relations is as essential as "getting the job done

Now, the relative importance of spécifie functions or goals fo
a system détermines the degree of accuracy required in com
munication: the more important thè goal, thè more severe th
accuracy requirements. In other words, the number of altern
tive de jure meanings defines a range of interprétation for sym

bols and their combinations and this set of alternatives is de-

rived from some existing system of standardized usage. Further-

more, as the function, purpose, or goal of the interaction is
cued and recognized by the participants, the range of de jure
meanings is reduced. But the more crucial the function, purpose, or goal to the interaction situation, the greater the réduction in the range of de jure meanings.
An example may help clarify my point. In operator-directed

long distance dialing the standardized usages appropriate to
greeting and terminating transactions between the customer and
Operator hâve a broad range precisely because the functions of

greeting and terminating are not at ail crucial to the proper
functioning of the system. On the other hand, standardized
usages for encoding and decoding information concerning the
origin and destination of calls allow very little latitude because
that information is crucial to the system's functioning. Thus, it
is quite clear that the standardized usage mechanism is necessary to explain the better than random frequency of accurate
transfer of meaning, given the inhérent flexibility of symbols.

Standardized usage can be viewed as deriving from a psychologically consistent set of content, procédural, and translative
rules. A rule is a prescription for action consisting of: (a) a protasis indicating the situations in which the rule is applicable and
(b) an apodosis indicating the action which ought to, may, or
must be performed.9 If situation X develops (protasis), then Y

ought to follow (apodosis). Just as numerous rules for chess

JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA ZOO

playing form thè standardized usage for chess situ

merous rules governing communicative situations for
dardized usages for those communicative situations.

Content rules guide choice among alternative sy

propriate to différent situations and to the goals of t

tions. Thus, a concept capable of being understo
municated in any of several différent messages w
greatest chance of accurate transmission when com

in the message style appropriate to a spécifie situation
tion. Translative rules indicate what various symbols
as or mean, and this definitional process may differ

tion to situation for the same symbol. Thus, high
symbols with broad ranges of de jure meanings will

ranges reduced by translative rules governing the

symbols in differing situations. Procédural rules gui

ern the organization of symbols in given situation
procédural rules called standard English grammar
lowable combinations of symbols in a situation suc

ing for a scholarly journal." However, procédural ru
made up solely of standard grammatical norms, sinc
appropriate in certain situations to invoke procédura
violate standard grammatical norms in order to achie
understanding or effect.

Before turning to the task of linking standardized u

prédiction and explanation of language behavior at
tional level, it may be useful to summarize the prece
cussion of standardized usage. In functioning and com

ing in a number of différent Systems, individuals acq

standardized usages, each of which has been develo
particular System for its own ends. In the proces
acting with others and interpreting their messag
différent situations problems with compétition am
standardized usages could arise; that is, symbols are
that flexibility can be an obstacle to accurate meanin
Also, each interactive situation has a purpose or go
more or less important to maintaining the interactiv

and which, in turn, directly alters the allowed flexibil

of the symbols used. Thus, in order for there to
transfer of meaning, a standardized usage must be
opération to govern both encoding and interprétatio
in order for the same standardized usage to be g
choices of ail participants in the situation, the Comm
must eue his listeners to the function or purpose of
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action and the System to which the standardized usage he h

chosen is indigenous.* By now thè link between standard
usage and prédiction and explanation at the intentional

should be manifesting itself, so let us turn to the task of f or
izing thè link.

IV. The Functional Prerequisites for thè Accurate
Transfer of Meaning

The functional prerequisites of a communicative System can
defined as that set of conditions - relationships, structures, ra

of variables, etc. - which must be met in order that the
tem exist. In other words, the functional prerequisites

the necessary conditions for a System to achieve a specified g
state. Although any number of goals can be specified for co
municative Systems or situations (e.g., understanding, persu

sion, uncertainty réduction, motivation to action), it is c

that none of thèse goals is achievable without thè accurate tr

mission of symbolic meaning as a necessary condition. I
ohosen to focus on communicative Systems that require

maintenance of a goal-state which is thè accurate transmiss
of symbolic meaning. By taking such a choice, we focus direc
on that set of conditions necessary to explain, predici, evalu
or prescribe effective messages.
The following are, on this view, the functional prerequisit
for thè accurate transmission of meaning in a communicati
situation:

A. There must exist minimal consensus among individuals
within the situation on thè basic indicators of understanding and

lack of understanding; for example, nodding and shaking the

head.

B. The récipients of a message must recognize that the message is directed to them.
C. The récipients must recognize that the Communicator intends to produce some effect; at a minimum, the intended effect is understanding.

D. There must exist a stable set of standardized usages approximately governing
* The interactive situation may hâve developed its own standardized usage
and hence, there would be no other System to eue; rather, the présent situation would eue its own standardized usage.
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1. from thè speaker's side:
(a) symbol choices suited to the System and tas
(b) symbol-combination choices suited to the Sy
and task;
2. from the récipients' side:
(a) referent-choice for the transmitted symbol, given
the System and task, and

(b) referent-choice for combining the transmitted
Symbols, given the System and task.

(The concept of standardized usage is normative or conventional and, hence, implies that erroneous (nonstandard) choices

from thè set of alternatives are possible, recognizable, and

remediable by others sharing that standardized usage. That is,
sanctions, in their broadest sensé, are imposed for déviations
from consensual positions. )

E. There must be a set of implicit or explicit (verbalized)

eues indicating at a minimum:

1. the System from which the standardized usages are
chosen, and

2. the functional purpose or task of the interactive
situation.

F. There must be a consensus among the Communicator and
listeners on the set of alternatives available for message construction and those available for message interprétation.

To establish the above conditions as necessary for thè accurate transfer of meaning, one need demonstrate only that accurate transfer of meaning is impossible (or at least unlikely)
in the absence of one of the conditions. That is, piA p2A . . .Λ

P6 are necessary for q, if ^ pt, i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, implies ~ q.
A. Without minimal consensus on the indicators of under-

standing, accurate feedback becomes an impossibility. Without
that minimal feedback, an individuai cannot know if he is tap-

ping a set of standardized usages which are shared with his
listener, and accuracy becomes a random phenomenon at best.
B. The necessity of recognizing thè "directedness" of a mes-

sage becomes clear in light of conditions C and E. If the importance of eues for standardized usages (E) and of minimal
consensus on intended effects ( C ) is granted, then one must also

grant that the probability of thèse eues and intended effects
being recognized decreases dramatically when récipients of messages are unaware of their rôles as récipients. John Searle backs
the position:
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If I am trying to tell someone something, then ( assumin
certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognizes
that I am trying to tell him something and exactly wha
it is I am trying to tell him, I hâve succeeded in telling

it to him. Furthermore, unless he recognizes that I am

trying to tell him something and what I am trying to te
him, I do not fully succeed in telling it to him.10

Conditions C, D, E, and F are Searle's "certain conditions."

C. If Bennett's analysis for accurate prédiction and valid ex

planation of output at the intentional level is applied to p

diction and explanation of the message-output of communicati
situations, then the individuals in those situations must posse
and share a goal or set of goals. Although there can be numer
ous such intended effects on the part of a speaker, the speak
must at least attempt to be understood. Without that minim

intended effect or minimal shared goal, the listeners co

never ascertain the intended meaning of a message because th
possibility of déception and purposeful misdirection would co
found the listener's attempts to interpret. In Bennett's langua
the communicator-listener System would no longer be "rationa

D and E. Throughout this discussion the need for a shar

perspective concerning the construction and interprétation o
messages has been emphasized. Without such consensus, a sym
bol or combination of symbols, X, could be transmitted, but

both persons, Px and P2, were asked what the symbol

meant and asked to predict what the other meant by X, w

would expect only random accuracy between Pi's meaning and
P2's prédiction of F^s meaning. However, the resolution of th
problem is more complex than merely achieving consensus on
the meaning of a symbol.
The flexibility of symbols implies not only that a given symb
has a range of alternative interprétations as a function of th

situation, but (a) that the same concept can be encoded di

ferently in différent situations with identical interprétation

and (b) that the same concept can be encoded differently

the same situation with differing interprétations. For examp
politicai campaign strategists often gear the présentation of th
oandidate's position on a key issue to the standards of interpré
tion of varying geographical localities - in line with (a) and (b
above.

As suggested earlier, if the intent of the speaker is to b
correctly predicted through his speech, then the speaker a
listener must share the criteria for choice among alternative
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That is, each must be cognizant of the normative or c

tional choices. In cuing the System of standardized usage
thè function or task of the interactive situation, the alter
generated by flexibility of Symbols are altered since (a) th
tem-cue* calls into play the standardized usages which ar

ventional to that interactive situation, (b) the functio

further reduces the alternatives to a subset of the initial s

alternatives defined by the standardized usage and call
opération by the system-cue, and (c) the importance

function to the interactive situation further narrows th
of alternative encodings and interprétations so that the in
of personal style is minimized. If there were no mechani
reducing the staggering number of alternatives generated
flexibility of Symbols, the probability of accurate transf

meaning would be very low indeed. The concept of sta

ized usage identifies such a mechanism.
In Bennett's language, the function (task or purpose) of
interactive situation, the importance of that function to t
teractive situation, and the System from which the standa
usage is derived constitute together thè set of constraints
impose restrictions on the alternatives from which the l

will choose his interprétation. The normative or conve
choices, which are thè standardized usages themselve

nothing more than the "rational" criteria for choiee which
be shared by thè speculative or behavioral investigators o
communicative process if their prescriptions, évaluations
dictions, and explanations are to be valid and useful.

F. In light of the discussion of D and E above, cons

on the set of alternatives available for encoding and interp

is imperative. However, an example from Ashby11 may
the point clearer. Consider two kidnapped individuals wh

permitted to send one message each to their loved one
first is allowed to send one of the following messages:
I am well
I am sick

I am dying,

and chooses the first. The second is allowed only one alternative: I am well. Without knowledge of the alternatives available to each, the récipients of the messages are likely to con* That is, the System of usage to which the current standardized usage is
indigenous.
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elude that both are well, whereas knowledge of the alternativ

available to each would lead to vastly différent conclusion

The notion that what is not said is just as important as what
said takes on a more precise meaning in this framework.

Let us now consider the implications of this formalizatio

for behavioral and speculative investigations of communicatio

V. Some Implications for the Investigation of Communicati

A. Exphnations are normative or conventional rather tha

hw-like. Within the paradigm presented above both behaviora
and speculative students of communication must prescribe, pr

dict, evaluate, and explain based on thè set of norms or co
ventions (i.e., standardized usages) which are peculiar to th
interactive situation in question. Furthermore, while we hâ

suggested that law-like explanations may be inappropriate for
speech acts, we hâve in no way admitted that the application

law-like explanations to communicative acts is logically im
possible. It might be argued that because explanations of i
tention (or explanations by reasons) are non-contingent, th
cannot logically be said to cause the actions (e.g., speech b

haviors) that follow and, hence, explanations of intention can

not admit of prédiction and control whereas law-like, cau

explanations are suited to prédiction and control. Such a positio

is extreme and needs modification. The argument in favor
law-like, causal explanation centers predominantly on the con
tingency of causes as opposed to the non-contingency of inte
tions or reasons. However, if I know that a politician intends
win my vote, not only will his actions in the past and présen
be befcter understood, but the ranges of his alternative actio
in the future are reduced, thereby increasing my chances of pr

dicting his actions.12 With regard to speech acts: if I assum

that the speaker always intends that I understand his message

then I reduce the range of alternative means he seems like

to employ to achieve that end. Furthermore, the systemic an
functional eues that the speaker provides further reduce altern
tives and, thus, increase my prédictive and explanatory power.
Clearly, explanations of intentions are not as powerful predictors as causal or law-like explanations. Under explanations o
intention, the action (or conclusion for the syllogism) is not en

tailed by the major and minor premises but only made mo
or less probable by them. The analysis of sections II throu
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IV above has indicateci that set of conditions which must occur

to achieve maximum predictability of thè meaning of a message while maintaining the identity of explanation by reason.

I have also argued that the logic of such explanation seems

well suited to the logic of language behavior, whereas the logic

of law-like explanation seems suited to those aspects of language behavior of only peripheral interest.

B. Standardized usages must be discovered rather than imposed. Most inquiry which has as its goal the establishment of
law-like relationships seeks to impose on the phenomena under
study the most parsimonious and predictively powerful law that
intuitive genius permits. The work of Kepler on planetary orbits
and that of Bohr on atomic physics are excellent examples of

this technique. This process of imposing form or pattern on

phenomena is also exemplified in the wave-particle conceptions
of electromagnetic radiation. But it is important to notice that

while each of thèse théories of light conceptualizes the phenomenon very differently, thè physical laws or relationships gov-

erning electromagnetic theory do not change as a resuit of

différent impositions of pattern. In other words, the logic of
naturai phenomena is such that its "reality" or patternedness
can be imposed by the investigatar without destroying the logic
of the phenomena.
Such a state of affairs is probably not trae of social phenomena

in generai,13 and it is certainly not true of communicative
phenomena as I have conceived them. The imposition of form
on phenomena, when they are normative, convenüonal, bound
to situations, and bound to the unstable shared perspectives of
individuals, is at least inappropriate and ineffectuai and, probably, impossible. In characterizing communicative behavior in
terms of standardized usages we are in effect arguing that the
imposition of form or structure by speculative or behavioral investigators is not congruent with the logic of the phenomena.
The logic of normative criteria for choice (standardized usage)
is such that it émerges from an interactive situation through the

agreement of participants to share a common perspective in

order to achieve some goal. Hence, in investigation, standardized
usages must be discovered rather than imposed14 if the investigator's prédictions are to be accurate and his explanations valid.
C. Prescriptions for and évaluations of communication must
be situation bound and rule governed. The previous discussion
has some implications for setting down prescriptions for effective
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construction of messages. First, regardless of the speaker's other

pnrposes, prescription will assume that he seeks to be understood by his audience. Second, the speaker would be enjoined
to be audience-centered by tapping a standardized usage familiär to his audience. Thirdly, the encoding choices made by the
speaker will be seen as constrained by the situation. Lastly, prescriptions, themselves, will be seen as normative, conventional
and, most importantly, discoverable.

The particular standardized usage adopted in any communicative interaction provides insight into pragmatic, aesthetic, and
ethical évaluations. For example, a speaker cognizant of the most
effective standardized usage for an existing situation may refuse
for ethical reasons to adopt that standardized usage and so suffer the conséquences - lack of success. In other words, standard-

ized usages are thè appropriate, normative, and expected encoding choices in a situation given a goal; adhérence to or déviation from those usages provides information to both a rhetorical

critic and the audience. That information can be used to evalu-

ate the pragmatic efficacy, the ethics of choice, and the aesthetic
form of the message.

VI. Summary
I hâve attempted to investigate the assumptions underlying the

law-like explanations of behaviorists and the reason-explanations of speculative investigators as applied to language behavior. I hâve hoped to point out the weaknesses of both positions and to forge a new position by stipulating the conditions

under which the prédictive power of reason-explanations is
maximal. A set of mechanisms necessary for thè accurate transfer of meaning in interactive situations has been posited and described, and the implications of my analysis for prescription,
évaluation, explanation, and prédiction of communicative acts

hâve been summarized.
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